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Many governments around the world are thinking critically about their international
investment treaties and international investment policy, spurred in part by growing public
pressure and debate about how to best attract and govern multinational enterprises.
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flows are the types of investment they want. States are also
considering whether any potential benefits in terms of investment
flows outweigh the costs of these treaties in terms of litigation
expenses, potential liability, reduced policy space, or other
considerations; and whether there are other policies that are better
tailored to meet their investment attraction and development
objectives. Some traditionally capital exporting states are also
assessing whether their investment treaties are consistent with their
stated development policies toward their capital importing partners.4
Accordingly, states increasingly recognize the importance of taking
stock of existing investment treaties as well as policies regarding
future texts, and are more strategically considering the advantages
and disadvantages of these agreements, and whether, when and on
what terms to sign, maintain, or amend them. This research paper
aims to help that analysis by (1) providing an overview of literature
on the costs and benefits of investment treaties with ISDS, and (2)
examining policy implications and conclusions.
In summary, this paper highlights that the costs of investment treaties
are increasingly apparent, but the benefits largely unproven; thus, it
is an opportune time for countries to review their policies and
practices regarding these instruments. The conclusion of this paper
also suggests practical steps that states can take to assess these costs
and benefits, and identifies considerations and strategies relevant for
managing obligations contained in existing treaties and shaping
future agreements.
Farmers working in onion
plantations in Argapura,
Indonesia. 
Several phenomena are driving this heightened attention: One is that
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) claims brought under
international investment treaties have been on the rise, involving a
broadening set of claims, and seeking millions, or even billions, of
dollars in damages for alleged breaches of fairly open-ended treaty
standards. As of July 31, 2017, 817 known ISDS claims had been filed,
and at least 114 states had faced formal claims.1 This is particularly
staggering given that the first ISDS case was filed only 30 years ago and
fewer than 50 cases had been filed before the year 2000.2 This means
that the implications of investment treaties and ISDS have really only
become apparent in the last 15 years. 
A second and related factor is that negotiations of new treaties have
attracted greater public attention. Some of these new agreements are
unprecedented in terms of the breadth of investment they cover, the
restraints they place on countries’ powers to regulate investors and
investments and the complexity of their provisions; others, such as
the texts concluded by Brazil, are also attracting attention for their
decision to eschew strong investor protections in favor of a more
pragmatic focus on investment promotion.3
A third factor is that states are focused on attracting investment that
will help propel their sustainable economic growth and development
and, in that context, are evaluating the policies and tools that are
effective and efficient in advancing that aim. As part of that evaluation,
they are reassessing whether investment treaties do in fact help
increase investment flows and, more specifically, whether induced
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EXPECTED BENEFITS
Increased inward investment
A common rationale offered for investment
treaties is that they and their ISDS provisions
can encourage investment. Evidence that
investment treaties have the effect of
increasing investment flows is, however,
inconclusive.5 In short, 
‘common assumptions about the role of
[bilateral investment treaties (BITs)] in
attracting foreign investment are
unsupported by a considerable amount of
quantitative and qualitative evidence. For
the vast majority of investors, BITs do not
appear to be important – directly or
indirectly – when determining where, and
how much, to invest abroad’.6
INSIGHTS FROM RESEARCH
6 |  COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
PART II. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES – INSIGHTS FROM RESEARCH
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT |  7
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATES
Studies on determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) confirm
that other factors – such as market size and growth, the availability
of natural resources, and the quality of hard and soft infrastructure –
tend to be far more important to investors than investment treaties
when making the decision to invest.7 This helps explain why, for
example, investment flows between the United States and China are
high despite the absence of an investment treaty, and why Brazil has
continued to be a major destination for foreign investment despite
having ratified no investment treaties with ISDS. Similarly, it helps
explain why countries that have stepped away from investment
treaties do not appear to have suffered losses of FDI: 
»       South Africa announced several years ago that it would be
terminating its BITs, and has since terminated almost all of its
agreements with capital exporting states;8 yet it has continued
to be the top African destination for FDI projects through 2016;9
»       Indonesia announced in 2014 that it would terminate its BITs and
has since terminated 27 of 53 BITs previously in force;10
nevertheless, in 2016, ‘FDI into Indonesia by capital investment
increased by 130% to $38.5 billion as a result of multiple metals,
chemicals and coal, oil and natural gas projects’;11 and
»       India, which released a new model BIT in 2015 that was notably
narrower in its protections than its previous agreements, became
the leading destination for FDI in Asia.12 That spot was previously
held by China,13 a country which, in contrast to India, has been
expanding its BIT network and increasing the breadth and
strength of its commitments in those agreements. 
While these examples are anecdotal, empirical evidence that BITs lead
to increased foreign investment is also inconclusive.14 Overall,
available evidence does not support the hypothesis that BITs result
in higher investment flows than in the counterfactual case. 
Moreover, while an investor may naturally want the strong substantive
and procedural protections that an investment treaty can provide, and
may therefore structure its investment so as to ensure that it is covered
by a favorable investment treaty (e.g., by establishing an affiliate in a
nominal “home” country, and routing its investment through that
affiliate),15 that does not mean that the investor would not have made
its investment in a particular host state, absent the investment treaty
or with an investment treaty offering weaker protections. Thus, even if
investment treaties and ISDS were found to influence whether FDI
flows originate in or flow through a particular “home” country, that
does not mean that those treaties actually affect investors’ decisions
on whether or how much to invest in a particular host country. At most,
we may be able to say that investors will often seek to take advantage
of all available legal protections when making their investment
decisions, including how to structure their investments.
To the extent that political risk is a limiting factor hindering foreign
investment, other means are available to investors to protect
themselves against some of the risks associated with investing abroad.
Various public and private risk insurers, for example, provide coverage
that supports outward investment by reducing exposure to political
risks.16 But, more broadly, it is exceedingly unclear that investment
treaties (which effectively act as free political risk insurance and
provide compensation when certain kinds of political risks materialize)
address many of the conditions and limiting factors that are hindering
investment. The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness
Index, for example, considers factors such as corruption, crime, theft,
tax rates and other issues that hinder investment; those factors are not
specifically addressed by investment treaties.17
Importantly, even if there were a link between investment treaties and
FDI flows, investment agreements and their protections can
potentially undermine investment and its intended benefits.
For one, there is evidence that the mere initiation of an ISDS claim
against a country can result in a drop in FDI into that country; and, if
the country loses that ISDS case, that the drop is even more
significant.18 Thus, even if ISDS were to spur additional FDI, those
positive effects might later be negated by an ISDS claim – which is
easy for an investor to file – or loss of an ISDS dispute. 
A second issue is that some early-stage investors have reportedly used
the threat of ISDS claims as a bargaining tool in order to secure an
investment in the host state. In Bear Creek v Peru, for example, the
investor appears to have used its ISDS claims in order to press the
host government to approve the investor’s controversial mining
projects that the government had rejected.19 Investments that a
government allows in order to settle or avoid a potentially costly ISDS
claim technically count as investment inflows but may not be the type
of FDI that brings benefits to the host country. 
A third consideration is that, while investment treaties may be seen as
favorable by some investors, they may also reduce the host country’s
ability to secure ample revenues desirable for other investors (and
other stakeholders). Wellhausen, for example, highlights that many
investors use investment treaties to challenge measures that were
taken by the government in order to raise revenues or reduce costs,
such as decisions to impose new taxes or terminate incentives or
subsidies. ‘Because sovereign bondholders ultimately care most about
debt serviceability’, they may be ‘indifferent to – or even rewarding of’
such revenue-raising or cost-reducing measures.20 Nevertheless, those
are precisely the types of measures that have come under repeated
attack through ISDS claims. Thus, investment treaty rules, which can
reduce governments’ willingness or ability to adopt new revenue-
raising or cost-saving policies, may ultimately make it more difficult
for governments to raise funds through issuing sovereign bonds.21More
generally, by reducing or threatening governments’ powers to increase
their revenue, investment treaties can also reduce the amount of
government resources available for public investments in education
and infrastructure that are in fact crucial for domestic and international
investors and the country’s sustainable development. 
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Work by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) has similarly questioned whether the special
rights given to some investors under investment treaties may
discourage support from other potential project funders. Examining
the implications of shareholder claims for reflective loss, which are
only exceptionally allowed in advanced systems of corporate law22
but are now commonly permitted in ISDS cases,23 the OECD notes that
such shareholder claims may have a range of impacts harmful to
companies, including potentially increasing risks for, and,
consequently the cost of capital offered by, creditors.24
A fourth issue, and one which is discussed further below in the
discussion on costs, is that even if the protections offered by
investment treaties were found to be effective in increasing FDI flows,
those protections may come at a high cost as judged both by what is
actually necessary, and by impacts on other economic, social, and/or
environmental goals. Governments could, in theory, guarantee
investors protections against all future losses caused by technological
change, new environmental regulations, or evolving societal
demands. Such policies insulating the investors from risks might well
induce their investment. But is that a good policy? Protections of such
broad scope may encourage investment, but tie the government’s
hands when it comes to advancing the country’s development goals
and/or could drain public budgets when investors suffer relevant
losses. Moreover, such government-provided insurance could give rise
to moral hazards, encouraging undesirable risk-taking by companies
and weakening investors’ incentives to reduce risks by striving to meet
societal demands, staying ahead of regulation, and driving
innovation. While the protections offered by investment treaties may
not be as broad as those offered in this hypothetical, it is offered to
highlight the importance of examining both benefits and costs.
Effectiveness in terms of increased investment cannot be the only
measure of “success”. The price paid in terms of liabilities assumed
by the public and undesirable behavioral signals sent to the investors
must also be taken into account.
Fifth, the investment covered by investment treaties is not necessarily
beneficial for the host state. While it is well known that international
investment – in particular FDI – can produce wide-ranging benefits in
host countries (e.g., bringing jobs, technology, know-how, and capital
across borders), it is also well known that those positive effects do not
always materialize. Research indicates that in certain contexts FDI can
crowd-out domestic firms,25 contribute to inequality,26 worsen
corruption,27 facilitate tax evasion and avoidance,28 and generate food
insecurity.29 Research also shows that the impact of FDI on the
environment can be good or bad.30 There is evidence that FDI creates
“pollution halos” and enables environmental “leapfrogging” –
phenomena whereby foreign investors bring newer, cleaner
technologies to the host country, thereby improving the environmental
performance of companies in that country.31 But in other cases, FDI
can leave a major environmental footprint, exacerbate pre-existing
environmental challenges and/or discourage environmental
policymaking.32 Depending on factors such as the type of investment,
the corporate culture of the investor and the institutional and
regulatory framework of the home and host countries, outcomes will
vary. It is important to remember that the potential benefits of FDI are
not automatic and that FDI can also result in economic, environmental
and social damage in the host country and to its citizens, and its
foreign origin can make it difficult to secure redress for harms caused.33
Investment treaties, however, generally protect investors irrespective
of the nature of the relevant investment, the conduct of the investor,
or the impacts of the investment.34 Tribunals have tended to reject
the argument that investment must contribute to economic
development in the host state in order to benefit from the treaty
protections.35 As one arbitrator has described it, this means that even
an ‘entity which is systematically earning its wealth at the expense of
the development of the host State’ can benefit from the protections
of investment treaties.36
In conclusion, it is crucial for states to not only examine whether
investment treaties result in increased investment into the host
country (which is itself inconclusive), but also (1) whether that
increased investment is induced investment or investment merely
structured to benefit from the treaty; (2) whether the investment is
actually desirable; and (3) whether any benefits of the investment
outweigh the price paid for the investment in terms of lost policy space
or other costs (more of which are discussed below). When conducting
that cost-benefit analysis, it is also important to assess distributional
consequences of relevant gains and losses. Evidence available to date
counsels that countries examining their investment treaty policies
should not assume positive outcomes in terms of investment flows or
that ultimate benefits will flow from investment treaties.
Increased outward investment 
Countries may also conclude investment treaties in order to benefit
their outward investors, based on the assumption that supporting
outward investment by those entities will produce benefits that flow
back into the home country. This raises two key issues that are similar
to the issues discussed in the context of inward investment. One is
whether the benefits offered by standard investment treaties are what
the home country’s outward investors truly want or need. What are the
barriers those individuals and firms face that limit their investments
abroad? Do the treaties help them overcome those barriers? Outward
investing firms, like inward investing firms, may very much like to use
the added leverage provided by investment treaties to bring or threaten
to bring a claim against their “host” states. But this does not mean that
the treaty will be influential in, much less essential to, the companies’
investment decisions in the first place (or worth the costs the home
country has assumed so as to provide its investors that leverage).37
The other question is whether, in what ways, and under what conditions
the home country actually benefits from the outward investment it
supports. While some studies show that outward FDI can benefit the
home country (e.g., helping home country firms to expand, access
resources, technology, and other assets, and become more efficient,
thereby increasing the strength, competitiveness, and profitability of
the home country’s economy), actual outcomes may vary. 
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FDI motivated by an effort to take advantage of low labor standards and
weak environmental regulation, for instance, can hollow out industry
in the home country, place downward pressure on environmental
regulation and labor standards and wages, and, depending on the tax
planning of the outward investing firm, leave the home (and host
countries) unable to use their tax policies to capture benefits of the
firm’s increased efficiency and profitability. FDI may result from a
company shutting down manufacturing in the home country and
moving to another country, lured to that new location by generous
incentives, low labor costs, lax environmental regulations, or other
advantages. That move may make the home country firm more
competitive, enabling it to increase its profitability and invest more in
research and development or other high-skilled activities in the home
country. While this can have beneficial impacts in the home country in
terms of increased tax revenue and creation of high-quality jobs, those
positive impacts do not necessarily materialize if, for instance, profits
are held offshore in tax havens rather than reinvested at home.38
Moreover, those who benefit from FDI are often not the same as those
who are negatively impacted, an outcome that can, without effective
policies in place, generate within-country inequalities and discord.39
Notably, there are other ways to support outward investment that can
be tailored to try to avoid negative impacts at home and abroad. The
United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), for
example, offers various kinds of financial products to assist United
States outward investors. Unlike investment treaty protection that is
provided to an investor regardless of the impacts of the investment,
OPIC’s eligibility criteria are designed to ensure that investment
projects demonstrably benefit the host country and do not harm the
US home economy.40
It is thus important to distinguish between the benefits investment
treaties offer to the outward investing firm and those received by the
home country, and then compare whether the costs borne by the
home country (and its constituents) outweigh their benefits. Just as
the amount of inward FDI is not an accurate proxy for measuring the
benefits investment treaties provide to host countries, the amount of
outward FDI (or even the amount of outward FDI actually induced by
the investment treaty) is not an accurate proxy for assessing whether
and to what extent the treaties benefit the home country. 
For countries assessing their outward investment policies, it is
therefore crucial to (1) consider whether, what types, and under what
circumstances outward investment provides positive spillovers into
the domestic economy, (2) identify (through, for example, the use of
surveys) limiting factors that are hindering optimal amounts and types
of outward investment, (3) consider what policy tools the government
has to help overcome those limiting factors and which are the most
appropriate tools to use, and (4) assess what complementary
measures the government might want to adopt to anticipate and
address negative effects the home country may experience – such as
a reduced tax base or increased unemployment among workers of
certain skill-sets – as a result of overseas investment promotion efforts.
Finally, it is important for home countries to consider how increased
investment may affect host countries, and to ensure that the investors
and projects the home countries support do not undermine
sustainable development abroad. 
“Depoliticization” of disputes 
Another key purported benefit of investment treaties is that, by
enabling investors to bring claims directly against the states in which
they have invested, the treaties “depoliticize” those disputes.41 From
the perspective of the host state, this appeals to the host state’s desire
to be free from “gunboat diplomacy”, diplomatic protection, or other
political or economic sanctions imposed by the investor’s home state
as a result of the host state’s alleged mistreatment of the investor.42
Depoliticization from the home state’s perspective appeals to the
home state’s desire to avoid muddying its diplomatic relations with
the host state by getting involved in disputes between the home state’s
investors and their foreign host governments.43 The theory is that by
providing investors the ability to bring arbitration claims directly
against their host governments, the home state need not be involved.
Additionally, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention)44 – a
treaty governing enforcement of international arbitration awards –
bars the home state from ‘giv[ing] diplomatic protection, or bring[ing]
an international claim, in respect of a dispute’ already initiated by its
investor against the host state under the ICSID Convention.45
However, as discussed below, in both theory and practice, the specific
contribution of investment treaties and, more specifically, ISDS, to the
objective of depoliticizing investment disputes is uncertain. Moreover,
“politicization” may not be as much of a problem as it is often portrayed
to be and, in fact, may in some cases and from some perspectives even
be preferable to more legalistic forms of dispute resolution. 
Treaty provisions and related legal rules on depoliticization
From the host state’s perspective, investment treaties and the rules
governing ISDS do not necessarily provide any practical or legal shields
from involvement in the dispute by the home state. This is because:
»       In all investor-state disputes, the home state is able to involve its
political machinery both before any arbitration has been
initiated (so as to influence a host state’s actions toward an
investor)46 and after an award has been issued if the host state
fails to comply with that ISDS award;47
»       In all non-ICSID investor-state disputes (e.g., investor-state
arbitrations under the New York Convention, unless the investment
treaty states otherwise), the home country can pursue diplomatic
relief on behalf of its investor while the dispute is pending;
»       Restrictions that are included in the ICSID Convention or in the
underlying investment treaty on the use of diplomatic protection
can be undermined through treaty shopping and parallel claims;48
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»       The home state can still make political decisions regarding
whether and/or how to get involved in an ISDS dispute through
such means as providing (or deciding not to provide) a tribunal
with its interpretation of the underlying investment treaty,49 or
through other means, such as being more or less willing to
provide evidence relevant to the dispute; and
»       The home state may be able to pursue action against the host
state under the investment treaty irrespective of whether an
investor has already initiated a claim.50
Moreover, it is likely giving investment treaties and ISDS too much credit
to trace the decline of “gunboat diplomacy” to ISDS’s mere existence. If
ISDS were unavailable, we cannot assume that home states would
resort to force in violation of other norms of international law. 
Similarly, from the perspective of the home state, even when
investment treaty protection and ISDS are available to its investors,
the home state possesses numerous opportunities to exercise
discretion and determine whether and how to become involved in
disputes between those investors and their host governments. The
availability of ISDS may give home states an excuse to deflect those
investors that solicit government assistance in resolving a dispute,
but it does not require the home government to always adopt a
hands-off approach, a fact that investors may be likely to highlight
when pressing their home governments for support. 
Evidence of impacts of depoliticization
While very little is known about the extent to which the availability of
ISDS actually impacts home state and host state experiences of
politicization, studies that have been done suggest that the presence
or absence of an investment treaty with ISDS does not seem to
influence whether or not the investor’s home state is likely to place
diplomatic pressure on – or take adverse diplomatic action against –
the host state in connection with an investor-state dispute.51
More specifically, a recent analysis of United States practices
regarding concerns of its investors concluded the following:
Whether or not an investor has access to treaty-based investment
arbitration appears to make little difference to how strongly the
US government applies diplomatic pressure to resolve the
dispute. Just as the FDI-impact of the treaties has been
disappointing, the de-politicization promise of the investment
treaty regime may have failed [to deliver] as well. This could be
important for developing countries seeking to revisit their
investment protection policies, as it raises questions [about]
whether the use of inter-state dispute settlement may not be a
better alternative to investor-state arbitration, as this at least has
the promise of less controversial and adventurist legal claims. 
…
[O]ur results indicate that even for such a highly legalized regime,
diplomatic considerations still play core functions in the
settlement of disputes. This is as expected in realist approaches
to international relations and warrants the question, whether the
promise of depoliticization from international legalization may
be more fiction than fact.52
Other studies have also questioned the underlying objective of
depoliticizing disputes. As Yackee has stated: 
Politicized dispute settlement need not entail, or even risk, resort
to force. Indeed, it can be apparently successful, especially where
home and host state governments, and perhaps also the
investor, perceive mutual gains from continued cooperation. This
does not mean that investors get everything they want, when
they want it. In politicized dispute settlement the investor does
not control the process—though he can certainly influence it—
and the investor’s interests are not the only ones in play.53
In other words, according to Yackee, political resolution of investor-
state disputes at the state-to-state level can moderate the investor’s
claims, while also helping to find an effective solution acceptable to
the home state, host state, and investor.
For countries assessing their investment policies, these issues and
experiences highlight the need to carefully assess whether
“politicization” is a warranted concern or may in fact be more
desirable than investors’ untethered access to legal recourse. States
can then consider what tools are effective to achieve the desired
outcomes in terms of (de)politicization (for example, by considering
what role ISDS has played, and whether and how legalized state-state
dispute settlement may differ) and at what cost.
Oil palm plantation 
in Malaysia. 
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COSTS
This section briefly summarizes the costs of investment treaty
protection and ISDS. It provides an overview of seven main categories
of costs. These are: (1) costs of litigation; (2) costs of liability; (3)
reputational costs; (4) costs in terms of reduced policy space; (5) costs
in terms of reduced power in contractual relations; (6) costs in terms
of a reduced role for domestic law-making; and (7) costs in terms of
generating uncertainty in the law. 
Litigation 
The costs of defending treaty claims brought by investors can be
significant. Studies have estimated that it costs each disputing party
roughly USD 5 million per case on average to cover legal fees and the
costs of the arbitral tribunal.54 Given that those are average figures,
there are of course examples of disputes in which the costs were lower
and those in which they were higher. In 13 of the 56 ICSID cases
concluded between 2011 and 2015 for which data is available, the
respondent’s legal expenses were less than USD 1 million.55 But in
some cases, costs have vastly exceeded USD 5 million. In the Yukos
arbitration disputes, for instance, the respondent state’s costs were
USD 27 million (and the claimant’s costs roughly USD 80 million).56
Additionally, in Libananco v Turkey, the respondent’s costs were nearly
USD 36 million (while the claimant’s were roughly USD 24 million).57
Even if a state successfully defends the case brought against it, it may
still have to pay those expenses.58 While tribunals sometimes order
investor/claimants that lose their ISDS claims to compensate
respondent states for the states’ legal expenses, this happens
infrequently (in 38% of the cases that investor/claimants lose), and less
frequently than the percentage of cases (53%) in which tribunals require
losing states to compensate successful investor/claimants for their legal
expenses.59 Moreover, even when tribunals order unsuccessful
investor/claimants to compensate the government for its legal
expenses and costs, states may face challenges recovering those orders
against the investor. If the investor refuses or fails to pay voluntarily,60
the state will need to take enforcement action, requiring additional
commitments of time and resources. The state may ultimately be
unable to recover from the investor if the investor is insolvent or
structures its holdings in order to make its assets judgment-proof.61
Liability
A second category of costs is actual liability. Based on publicly
available information, the average amount claimed by investors as of
the end of 2016 was $1.4 billion, and the average amount awarded
was $545 million, plus interest.62 Most awards are under $100 million,
but there have been a number of large awards, including some
awards for multiple billions of dollars.
Trends over time indicate that amounts awarded have been rising.63
This may be due in part to the fact that ‘[t]ribunals are increasingly
willing to accept income based approaches … which capture future
profits or returns’.64 Additionally, tribunals have been increasingly willing
to award compound interest, a practice which can significantly increase
the amount the state is ordered to pay.65 In cases decided before 2000,
tribunals awarded compound interest in roughly 40% of the cases. In
cases decided between 2011 and 2015, that number had risen to 86%.66
Overall, potential liability under investment treaties can be significant
for governments. Especially for emerging economies, and when the
claim arises out of an extractive industry project involving valuable
natural resources, liability can amount to a sizeable proportion of
government budgets. These considerations are highly relevant for
countries when considering the potential liability that they are willing
and able to assume. 
Reputational costs
In addition to the costs of litigation and liability, states may also face
reputational costs as a result of ISDS claims. As noted above, one
study found that the mere filing of an ISDS claim against a state is
connected with reduced inward FDI flows, and that inward FDI flows
drop even further when the state loses an ISDS case.67 For
governments seeking and competing for foreign capital, this may be
especially disconcerting. 
Reduced policy space
Another set of costs investment treaties and their ISDS mechanisms
impose on states is the cost of reduced policy space.68 Given their range
of responsibilities, governments need policy space to ensure that they
are able to enact, implement, revise, refine, and enforce their laws,
policies and practices in order to achieve public interest objectives,
and to do so in light of changing circumstances, evidence, needs and
priorities. Policy space enables legislatures to adopt new laws and
amend or terminate existing legislation; it enables executive officials
to set policies, refine them over time, and exercise discretion as
appropriate; and it enables administrative tribunals and judicial courts
to perform the roles assigned to them under domestic law in
interpreting, applying, and even crafting the law, ruling on the scope
of public and private rights and obligations, and invalidating or
imposing penalties on illegal or undesirable conduct. This policy space
can be especially important for governments whose legal frameworks
are still evolving and developing to reflect best international practice.
Such policy space is, of course, not unlimited. Even absent investment
treaties and ISDS, it is constrained, for example, by domestic norms of
due process and separation of powers, and international customary
and treaty law on human rights. Thus, the objection with investment
treaties is not that they limit government power, but that they do so
in ways that go beyond those other constraints, and that they unduly
discourage or require compensation for good faith action taken in the
public interest to achieve economic, social, and environmental aims. 
Some arbitral tribunals have interpreted investment treaty standards
to offer investors expansive protections for their property rights and
expectations that many countries at the national level have long been
unwilling to provide. 
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One example arises out of the protection for “indirect expropriation.” While
the domestic laws of many countries require governments to compensate
individuals/entities for “direct” expropriations (e.g., nationalizations of
property in which the government actually appropriates the investor’s
property), they do not always specifically protect against or require
compensation for “indirect expropriations” or “regulatory expropriations”
(e.g., good faith regulatory measures adopted by the government that
have the effect of reducing the value of an individual or entity’s private
property). Furthermore, determinations in domestic jurisdictions as to
whether and under which circumstances such compensation is warranted
are based on legal, political and sociological determinations that often
ebb and flow over time. In the United States, for example, the doctrine of
regulatory takings/indirect expropriation is infamously complex and
controversial, and has generated significant academic literature and policy
debate regarding whether and, if so,  property owners should be
compensated for executive, legislative, or judicial conduct that negatively
impacts those property owners’ rights or interests. The United States
Supreme Court is frequently called upon to guide the evolution of this area
of law, and in so doing must carefully consider nuanced legal principles
that require balancing among competing interests and obligations.
Arbitral tribunals have generally interpreted investment treaties to
require governments to pay compensation for direct and indirect
expropriations (even if the treaty does not specifically refer to indirect
expropriation), an interpretation that can give rise to significant potential
liability for a wide range of actions taken by the government to resolve
matters of public interest. Arbitral tribunals are not required to consider
competing governmental obligations or interests that may have led to
certain actions. Measures that can be challenged on the ground that
they constitute an “indirect expropriation” include adoption of zoning
regulations that limit a potential property developer’s options;
deregulation of industries that aims to increase competition but hurts
the position of former monopolies; restrictions or bans on mining;
adoption of requirements for companies to pay employees health and
safety benefits; and regulation of pricing for a wide range of goods and
services such as crops, energy, water, and pharmaceuticals. 
Arbitrators are not bound by domestic law or policy on these issues, and
have interpreted treaties to provide even stronger levels of protection
against indirect takings than afforded under the laws of many domestic
jurisdictions, even when they have domestic laws covering indirect
takings.69 In addition to these protections against indirect expropriation,
investment treaties typically provide strong protections for economic
rights and expectations through their “fair and equitable treatment”
clauses, clauses that impose standards of conduct on states and offer
remedies to investors that may go well beyond what is otherwise
available domestically.70 As Santiago Montt has noted: 
It is shocking to consider that a United States investor may lose
a case against its government in the United States Supreme
Court, a German investor may lose the same case in the
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Constitutional Court), and a French
investor may lose it in the Conseil d’État, but, nevertheless, that
any of them may win it against a Sri Lanka or Bolivia on the basis
of such open-ended [IIA] principles as no expropriation without
compensation or [fair and equitable treatment].71
While there is considerable disagreement in domestic laws and
international law as to whether and in what circumstances
government-caused changes to property rights or expectations trigger
a duty of compensation, the fact that government actions or
omissions regularly cause changes in property rights protections is
undeniable. Indeed, even among Western nations that are considered
to have relatively clear and strong property rights rules, change has
long been endemic. As David Kennedy has highlighted:
In the history of the West, one has repeatedly started over,
inventing new kinds of property, eliminating or qualifying old
property rights and reallocating obligations and entitlements with
respect to resources. The invention of the limited liability
corporation, the abolition of slavery, the establishment – or later
privatization – of state enterprises or quasi-public institutions to
manage new modes of infrastructure, the establishment of zoning
regulations, changing rules about securitization, the invention of
commodity futures, or the changes in intellectual property rules
which have accompanied technological changes over the last
century are among the most common examples. Changes in
modes of economic activity have as often destroyed entitlements
and settled expectations about access to resources and the value
of assets as they have given rise to new rights, new duties, new
privileges and new obligations. New modes of property have
continually been devised to empower new types of actors in new
kinds of economic relationships, exploiting new forms of
knowledge or new resources. Existing entitlements can and often
have been reallocated, either slowly or quite precipitously as part
of a conscious project of social and historical renewal or struggle.72
Contrary to these patterns, and irrespective of how domestic laws and
institutions have decided to approach these issues, investment law
as interpreted through ISDS decisions has tended to disfavor change
and reallocations and emphasizes instead the importance of ensuring
that investors and their investments are able to enjoy stability in legal
rules (when such stability benefits them).73 That the government was
acting in good faith, for the public interest, and in compliance with
domestic law is not generally a defense.74
Provisions in investment treaties imposing restrictions on “performance
requirements” can further prevent governments from using policy tools
designed to ensure the host country effectively leverages foreign
investment for long-term and inclusive economic growth;75 and
provisions preventing discrimination can give rise to liability for
development and implementation of crucial domestic policies when
those policies have a disparate impact on foreign investors.76 Investment
treaties therefore place on governments an unprecedented set of
constraints limiting their ability to regulate domestic economic activity. 
In addition to limiting government action, investment treaties also
have been interpreted to impose mandates regarding what
affirmative conduct is expected of the state, and how it must allocate
its often scarce resources. For instance, in Ampal-American Israel Corp
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v Egypt, the tribunal concluded that Egypt’s failure to protect the
investor’s investment against terrorist attacks violated the investment
treaty’s “full protection and security” obligation.77 That decision,
involving a relatively common provision in investment treaties,
effectively imposed on the host state a duty to provide the investor
an expansive ‘insurance policy for terrorism’.78 According to Howse,
the implications are troubling: 
Failed or fragile states can scarce afford to indemnify investors,
often in the [hundreds] of millions of dollars for risks they can far
from fully control. … In effect, the consequence of this decision
is that investors would likely be put above all other victims of
terrorism and related political violence in conflict areas. That is
shocking from the perspective of international justice.79
However shocking, arbitral decisions are binding; thus, states that
face terrorist attacks may also face significant liability for failing to
take action to prevent those attacks. For many states, this is a risk that
should be considered, particularly when one such claim has already
been successful.
States have also been found liable for failing to take adequate action
to halt protests that disrupt investment projects. In Copper Mesa v.
Ecuador, for instance, the tribunal determined that the government
violated the fair and equitable treatment standard and the full
protection and security obligation for not doing enough to protect
the claimant’s proposed mining project from disruptions caused by
local community members concerned about the mine’s potential
impacts. According to the three arbitrators deciding the ISDS case,
“Plainly, the Government in Quito could hardly have declared war on
its own people. Yet, in the Tribunal’s view, it could not do nothing.”80
Overall, the implications of investment treaties for a state’s domestic
policy space are broad: the treaties generally govern conduct by all
levels (local, provincial, and federal) and branches (executive, legislative
and judicial) of government. States can even be held liable for acts of
state-owned enterprises (e.g., related to the state-owned enterprises’
handling of disputes with foreign shareholders or joint venture partners)
or based on their failure to adequately prevent, remedy, or otherwise
address acts of private parties. While some treaties attempt to preclude
or limit arbitral tribunal review of certain types of measures (e.g.,
taxation measures or measures taken in emergencies), investment
treaties typically allow claims against government conduct in all policy
spheres, from financial regulation to environmental protection. 
Due to the breadth of actions and inactions vulnerable to claims, fully
assessing costs in terms of possible challenges to government policy
space is particularly difficult. Nevertheless, governments ought to
understand the extent to which investment treaties, as they have been
interpreted by arbitral tribunals, give covered investors/investments
protections that go beyond domestic law (covering indirect or
regulatory takings, guaranteeing legal and regulatory stability,
protecting the expectations of investors including with respect to
receiving permits and future profits, insuring investors against attacks
of third parties including local communities, etc.). 
Even in cases in which an action may have also been improper under
domestic law, the remedies under international law may be more
onerous. In many jurisdictions, for example, individuals and enterprises
are able to challenge administrative conduct as being wrongful, but the
remedy may be procedural or an award of declaratory relief, not
compensation. Additionally, awards of compensation, if available under
domestic law, may be limited to sunk costs, or may be capped. Under
investment law, those same rules and restrictions on remedies do not
apply, and governments may be liable for millions or billions of dollars,
including for future lost profits. Countries should carefully assess the
strength of their treaties’ requirements and remedies as compared to
domestic law and whether the treaties’ stronger protections and greater
remedies for investors are justified.81
Distorted power dynamics
Certain sectors and types of investments appear to give rise to a
significant proportion of claims. These include investments in exploration
for or exploitation of natural resources and investments in infrastructure
and public services that are governed by investor-state contracts, permits
or licenses.82 There are a number of likely reasons for this:
»       such investments are often of major public importance and may
have substantial impacts on the environment, society or public
services. These investments therefore warrant robust roles for
government regulators and regulations, which in turn can give rise
to increased opportunities for investor-state disagreements;83
»       such investments are often long-term and so can be impacted
by changing circumstances and knowledge causing the
government and/or the investor to seek to modify the original
terms of the investment or contents of the governing legal
framework. When the modification is sought by the government,
and would have a negative impact on the investment, that can
also trigger ISDS claims;84
»       investments in infrastructure and provision of public services
often are made in connection with complex privatization schemes
involving previously unknown private sector partners, new
government institutions and governance regimes, and
heightened uncertainty and public concern about such issues as
the future of employment in state-owned entities and the price
and quality of goods and services produced. The number and
nature of unknowns associated with major privatizations increase
the likelihood that things will not proceed as originally planned
or hoped by at least some stakeholders, and the political and
public sensitivities involved raise the stakes of failure or dashed
expectations. As noted above, through investment treaties and
ISDS, investors are given strong powers to protect their
expectations and resist any public- or government-requested
change to what are frequently nascent and sensitive privatization
schemes when such change would disadvantage those investors;
additionally, investment treaties and ISDS give investors powerful
tools to push the government to modify the framework when
such changes are sought by the investors;
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»       investments in natural resources, infrastructure, and public services
are often governed by contracts or quasi-contractual instruments
such as permits or licenses. Investment treaties give investors
strong powers to enforce the beneficial terms of those deals as
strictly written, while also enabling them to contest enforcement
and seek renegotiation of unfavorable provisions; investors are also
able to claim that they are entitled to transparent and good faith
conduct from their government counterparty to the contract even
if underlying contract law does not impose such obligations and
therefore does not entitle the government to benefit from the same
treatment from the private sector party;85 and
»       the amounts claimed in ISDS cases relating to these types of
investments often reach into the hundreds of millions if not
billions of dollars, making the cases, though expensive to pursue,
worthwhile to bring. This also attracts the attention and support
of third party funders, whose backing may result in
claimant/investors pursuing claims they would otherwise have
been too risk averse to pursue.86
The power given to the private party in these cases to opt out of the
governing legal framework (e.g., the contract and the law of the host
state, a third state, and/or international law) and out of the dispute
resolution forum otherwise provided for in law or in the contract (e.g.,
domestic arbitration or dispute resolution in domestic courts) can enable
the investor to effectively secure a deal it had not, in fact, originally
obtained from the government, and hold governments to exacting
standards of conduct in highly complex and high-stakes scenarios.87 This
grants investors disproportionate power vis-à-vis government partners
and makes it especially difficult for governments to appreciate fully or
limit liabilities they have assumed under investor-state contracts or
quasi-contractual arrangements.88 This outcome - in which investors are
given greater powers in their relations with host country governments --
is often argued to be justified and important in light of investors’ general
vulnerability to host state actors. Indeed, one common narrative
characterizing infrastructure investments points to the phenomenon of
the “obsolescing bargain,” in which an investor, once it has significant
fixed assets in a country, is considered to be at the whim of host
government power and discretion. Based on that narrative, it is
contended that, in order to ensure a level playing field, investors should
seek international legal protection by structuring their investments so as
to take advantage of a favorable investment treaty. However, some
evidence suggests that rather than exploiting evolving power dynamics,
government parties to infrastructure contracts with private entities may
more commonly be the victims of power shifts and investor-initiated
efforts to change the terms of the deal after it has been agreed.89
Reduced role for domestic law-making
Since investment treaties typically permit investors to bring investor-
state arbitration claims in addition to or instead of pursuing relief before
domestic courts, arbitral tribunals, as opposed to domestic courts,
often have key powers to determine important issues of domestic law
that relate to the dispute, including issues of first impression on
questions of domestic law or the meaning of contractual provisions. 
In many jurisdictions, domestic courts play a fundamental role in
determining issues such as the conditions that need to be satisfied in
order for valid investor-state contracts to be formed, and whether
certain provisions contained in investor-state contracts are
enforceable (or, for example, whether they are void due to being ultra
vires or inconsistent with public policy).90 When investors take their
claims directly to arbitration, however, it is the arbitrators, not the
courts, that rule on those important issues of contract law and policy
and may come to dramatically different conclusions than domestic
courts regarding the meaning or legitimacy of a given contractual
provision. The state thus loses its power to shape and interpret its law. 
Similarly, to the extent that investors take their general grievances
regarding host state conduct to ISDS tribunals rather than domestic
courts, tribunals usurp the roles of those domestic courts (or
administrative agencies) in interpreting and applying domestic law
on issues of both substance and procedure.91
Uncertainty in the law
A final set of costs are those that arise from uncertainty in the law. Due
to several factors including vague language used in investment treaties
and the non-precedential nature of ISDS decisions, it is extremely
difficult to understand with certainty whether or not a given claim has
merit and, if so, what the damages awarded might be. Indeed, both
investors and states have spent years litigating relatively simple issues
of jurisdiction, requiring expenditures of time and legal fees. The
uncertainty makes it extremely difficult and costly for governments to
assess the likelihood that their conduct conflicts with treaty standards,
and communicate relevant information about investment treaty
standards to the diverse range of government actors whose conduct
could potentially give rise to claims. The uncertainty and
corresponding costs could also discourage states from adopting or
maintaining contested measures.92 As academics have explained:
[I]nvestment treaty protections that provide decision-makers
with greater certainty about how the protection would apply to
government measures will reduce the chilling of permissible
measures. Investment treaty protections that give arbitrators
unstructured discretions or that turn on ex post judgments that
decision-makers cannot easily predict when considering the
adoption of measures prospectively are likely to be associated
with greater uncertainty and greater chilling of measures that
would have been permissible.93
Some governments may be more sensitive to regulatory chill than others.
In particular, those with limited resources to fund potential liabilities,
provide required defenses, and risk reputational costs, and those
dependent on other countries for development assistance, economic
relations or diplomatic support, may be less willing to ultimately maintain
the measures that have been challenged and spend the years and
millions of dollars typically required to counter ISDS claims.94
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Oil palm plantation 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS ON COSTS & BENEFITS
As states look back over decades of treaty practice, the expected
benefits have not clearly materialized, whereas the costs have been
unexpectedly high. These costs are particularly high for countries with
foreign investment in long-term, strategic and/or lucrative industries;
those with developing legal systems or pre-existing government
challenges requiring ongoing regulatory reforms; and those with
complex diplomatic relationships with more powerful countries;
among others. Absent evidence that:
1.     treaty protections benefiting investors and investments are
causing increased investment flows, 
2.     those increased flows due to the investment treaties (inward or
outward) are beneficial to the home country, and
3.     the benefits outweigh the treaties’ costs, 
it is hard for states to justify the continuation of their investment
agreements or the conclusion of any new similar agreements.
PART III
NEXT STEPS
Solar and wind renewable
energy in Okinawa, Japan.
16 |  COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
PART III. NEXT STEPS
Many countries around the world are taking
stock of and reassessing policies toward their
existing and future agreements. These steps
enable governments to ensure that current
and future investment treaties provide
desired benefits without unexpected and
high costs.
With respect to existing agreements, some
governments have decided to terminate,
amend, and/or clarify their previously
concluded texts. These steps are not
mutually exclusive. Some governments, for
instance, have first agreed to amend their
treaties to exclude the “survival clause”, and
then terminate the text.95 States have also
sought to use their interpretive powers under
international law to clarify certain broad and
vague provisions in their investment
treaties,96 while also providing notice to
terminate the agreements.97
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT |  17
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATES
EXISTING TREATIES
For existing treaties, steps for states to consider include:
1.     Taking stock of existing treaties, including identifying 
for each treaty
a.     the treaty counter-party, 
b.     the treaty status (whether or not entered into force), 
c.      termination/renewal date and whether renewal 
         is automatic absent a notice to terminate,
d.     length of survival clause,
e.     amount and nature of investments covered,
f.       whether consent to ISDS is given and, if so, 
         how broad that consent is, and
g.     content of substantive obligations.
For treaties covering significant amounts of investment, it is crucial
to assess whether the treaty contains certain core provisions that give
rise to heightened risks, including broad, vaguely worded FET
obligations, protections against indirect expropriation, umbrella
clauses, and unrestricted transfer obligations. Treaties concluded a
decade or more ago in particular may have relatively strong and
potentially costly versions of these provisions.
2.     Developing a multi-stakeholder approach to gather input and
evaluate the treaties, assess their costs and benefits to different
constituencies, and formulate policy objectives. This includes
assessing how the obligations under the treaties compare with
those under domestic law,98 the extent of potential liability
generated by investment treaties due to the obligations’ strength
and remedies for breach, and whether/what aspects of the
investment environment are important for investors’ decisions; and
3.     Assessing whether, based on an analysis of the costs and benefits
of those agreements and its domestic policy objectives, a state
should maintain the agreements, renegotiate them, seek to
clarify them through interpretation of vague/broad provisions,
withdraw consent to ISDS, and/or terminate (on or before the
renewal/termination date).
FUTURE TREATIES
Additionally, governments are rethinking strategies regarding future
agreements, including the design of fundamentally different models
or moratoria on new texts. For future agreements, important steps for
states to consider include:
1.     Developing a multi-stakeholder approach to evaluate policy
objectives and priorities regarding inward and outward
investment, and to assess the relative effectiveness and costs
and benefits to different constituencies of using investment
treaties as a means of achieving those objectives; and
2.     If entering into negotiations for new investment agreements 
is determined to be an appropriate means of meeting 
policy objectives, 
a.      identifying criteria to assess whether and in what circumstances
         to engage in negotiations with another country; 
b.      determining the provisions, protections, and obligations
         that are desirable to include, following consideration of their
         costs and benefits; and
c.      formulating a model to be used as the basis  of those
         negotiations, as well as internal guidance regarding
         whether and under what circumstances deviations from
         different aspects of that model might be appropriate.
Transparent and multi-stakeholder processes are important: as the
complexity and costs of investment treaties have become more
apparent, officials have increasingly communicated with and sought
input from a broader range of constituents inside and outside the
government. These consultations can help states formulate
investment treaty policies that incorporate lessons learned and meet
modern objectives. They can enable states to:
»       identify risks of treaties (e.g., helping officials responsible for
environmental protection, health policy, taxation, financial
services regulation, energy regulation, and monetary policy
understand whether and in what contexts their actions may give
rise to liability under certain interpretations of the treaties),99
»       hear concerns of a range of investors and evaluate possible
policy interventions that can be adopted through treaty or
unilateral actions by home or host states,100
»       understand priorities and concerns of parliament and/or other
governing bodies, which will likely need to be considered and
addressed in order to secure approval of treaties and
amendments and minimize the political costs of such
agreements,101 and
»       appreciate the perspectives and concerns of the broader public
regarding the implications of investment treaties for such issues
as property rights and democratic governance.102
These processes are not necessarily fast.103 Yet in light of the long life-
spans and substantial implications of the treaties, and the importance
of having an effective investment attraction and governance
framework, it is crucial to take the necessary time to fully deliberate
and engage diverse perspectives regarding future courses of action.
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